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Abstract 
 
We document and then develop a model explaining and relating changes in firms’ organisation and in 
urban structure.  Sharing of business services by headquarters and of sector-specific intermediates by 
production plants within a city reduces costs, while congestion increases with city size. A fall in the 
costs of remote management leads to a shift in urban structure, from a configuration where cities 
specialise by sector and host integrated headquarters and production plants, to a configuration where 
cities specialise by function, with headquarters from different sectors and business services clustered 
in a few large cities and production plants from each sector clustered in smaller separate cities. 
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1. Introduction
When we study firms’ choices regarding their organisational form, we typically view these as in-
ternal to the firm. However, firms’ organisational choices are affected by the environment in which
they operate. And this environment is in turn shaped by the cumulation of firms’ organisational
choices. This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model in which firms’ organisational
choices are endogenous and interrelated and studies the links between firms’ organisation and
the urban system. In developing our model we address two recent trends, one having to do with
industrial organisation, the other one with urban structure.
The increasing separation of management and production activities is one of the most significant
trends in the internal organisation of firms of the last century (Chandler, 1977).1 Kim (1999)
carefully documents this process in his account of the rise of multi-location firms in the United
States. The percentage of US manufacturing establishments belonging to multi-location firms grew
steadily from only 7.4% in 1919 to 14.6% in 1947 and to 21.9% in 1987. In terms of employment, the
percentage of US workers employed in multi-location firms increased from 51.4% in 1939 to 73.1%
in 1987. A crucial component of the rise of multi-location firms has been the growing importance
of separate establishments acting as headquarters. The number of stand-alone headquarters and
their employment rose by 78.9% and 68.9% respectively between 1958 and 1987, as compared with
a 31% increase in overall multi-location employment in manufacturing.
At the same time, there has been a shift in the main dimension along which cities specialise, from
a specialisation by sector to a specialisation by function. Table 1 provides clear evidence of this shift,
which has so far not received much attention. The left-hand side of the table shows that sectoral
specialisation within manufacturing, as measured by a Gini index, declined steadily for cities
of all sizes between 1977 and 1997.2 The median US metro area saw its Gini index of sectoral
specialisation decline from .440 to .385 between 1977 and 1997. To get a better idea of the size of
this change, note that it is of the same order of magnitude — but of opposite sign — as the rise in a
Gini index measuring US household income inequalities from .365 to .425 between 1979 and 1996
(Burtless, 1999).
The right-hand side of table 1 shows that this falling sectoral specialisation has been replaced
by an increasing functional specialisation. In 1950 cities were not too different in terms of their
proportions of managers and production workers. And although the largest cities already housed
relatively more managers, there was no clear ranking by city size. By 1980 differences across cities
had increased substantially and a clear ranking by size had emerged: larger cities had become
specialised in management functions whereas smaller cities had become specialised in production.
This pattern became even more marked over the following decade. In 1990 the 9 largest US metro
areas had 39% more managers per production worker than the national average. For metro areas
with a current population between 1.5 and 5 million the figure was 25.7% above the national
1Another important trend has been firms’ increasing reliance on outside suppliers. This growth in outsourcing has
received wide attention in the literature (see Perry, 1989, for a survey) and is outside the scope of this paper, in which
we take the boundaries of the firm as given and focus on the location of activities within those boundaries.
2Alternative measures of specialisation show a similar decline over time as well as a greater specialisation of smaller
cities. Kim (1995) looks at US Census Regions instead of cities over a longer time period and finds that these have
experienced a similar decline in their sectoral specialisation since the 1930s.
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Table 1. The diminishing sectoral specialisation and increasing functional specialisation of US cities
Local populationa Sectoral
specialisationb
Functional specialisation
in management against productionc
1977 1987 1997 1950 1970 1980 1990
05,000,000−19,397,717 .375 .369 .348 +10.2% +22.4% +30.8% +39.0%
1,500,000−04,999,999 .287 .275 .257 +00.3% +16.7% +21.7% +25.7%
500,000−01,499,999 .352 .338 .324 −10.9% −10.0% −05.0% −02.1%
250,000−00,499,999 .450 .409 .381 −09.2% −09.7% −10.9% −14.2%
75,000−00,249,999 .499 .467 .432 −02.1% −06.6% −12.7% −20.7%
67−00,075,000 .708 .692 .661 −04.0% −33.7% −40.4% −49.5%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from County Business Patterns and Decennial Census.
aPopulation by Metropolitan Statistical Area/Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (New England County Met-
ropolitan Area in New England), or Non-metro Area. The same areas are included in each population class throughout
the table, on the basis of area definitions and population data from the Decennial Census of 2000.
bMedian value for each population class of a Gini index comparing the local and national distributions of employ-
ment shares across 2-digit SIC manufacturing sectors. If sh and sh are respectively the local and national shares of
employment in sector h, the Gini specialisation index is 12 ∑h |sh − sh|. Its value is close to one if a city is fully specialised
in a sector that is very small at the national level and is equal to zero if local employment is dispersed across sectors in
the same way as national employment.
cPercentage difference from the national average in the number of executives and managers per production worker
(occupied in precision production, fabrication, or assembly).
average. At the other extreme, non-metro Areas and metro areas with less than a quarter of a
million people had respectively 49.5% and 20.7% fewer managers per production worker than the
national average. Together with management functions, larger cities have also absorbed business
service employment (Kolko, 1999) as well as headquarters.3
In this paper we develop a formal framework that helps us understand and relate these two
trends. Our model (set up in Section 2) considers multiple final sectors, each made up of firms with
both headquarter and production activities. Each firm gains from integrating headquarter and
production in a single location because this saves in management costs. However, depending on
the urban structure, there may also be gains from becoming a multi-location firm with headquarter
and production establishments in different cities. This is because cities with a wider range of
business service suppliers are less costly places to operate a headquarter. Similarly, the sharing
of intermediate suppliers by plants reduces productions costs in cities with more same-sector
suppliers. At the same time, larger cities are more congested places which results in higher living
costs. Workers are mobile across cities and occupations, and the number and composition of cities
3According to Kolko (1999), in 1910 manufacturing accounted for about six times as much employment as business
services in all size-classes of cities. Over time this similarity across cities of different sizes has disappeared. There has
been a growing concentration of manufacturing in small and medium-sized cities and of business services in larger
cities, to the extent that the ratio of manufacturing to business service employment is now is now 4.5 times higher in
non-metro areas than in metro areas with over 2.5 million people. Regarding headquarters, Shilton and Stanley (1999)
study the location of over 5,000 headquarters in the US, and find that 40% of them are clustered in just 20 major urban
counties.
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are endogenous.
We begin to solve the model by determining the types of cities that can exist in equilibrium
(Section 3). Then we derive both the equilibrium choice of organisational form by firms and the
equilibrium urban structure (Section 4). When the additional costs associated with managing
production from a remote headquarter are high, firms remain integrated. Given the benefits of
sharing intermediate suppliers and urban congestion costs, cities host headquarters and produc-
tion plants but specialise by sector. However, when the additional costs associated with managing
production remotely fall below a certain level, for which we provide a closed-form solution, both
the organisation of firms and the urban structure undergo profound changes. Firms previously
organised as single units become multi-unit organisations. In choosing where to locate their now
separate establishments, firms aim to place their headquarter in cities where business service em-
ployment is abundant and their production plant in cities with a greater same-sector specialisation
in final production. Since similar organisational and location choices are made by a large number
of firms, this in turn affects the employment patterns of cities, which is itself what makes the
organisational choice worthwhile. This leads to a shift in the main dimension along which cities
specialise, from a specialisation by sector to a specialisation by function. As a result of the benefits
of sharing business service suppliers across firms and sectors, headquarters from different sectors
and business services cluster in a few large cities. Manufacturing plants, for which localisation
economies are weaker empirically as well as in the model, cannot afford to pay high enough wages
to compensate for the high congestion costs. They move away and cluster in smaller separate cities.
We conclude the paper with some final remarks and suggestions for further work (Section 5).
Of the large literature dealing with the organisational and location choices of firms, three
particular streams are more closely related to our work. The theoretical literature on multinational
enterprises has endogenised firms’ choice of location for multiple facilities (Helpman, 1984, and
Markusen, 1984, are two early examples, while Markusen, 1995, provides a survey). However,
this line of work focuses on the location decisions of firms taking the environment in which
they operate as exogenous, whereas we are interested in determining firms’ operating environ-
ment endogenously as a general equilibrium outcome shaped by firms’ decisions. More recently,
Grossman and Helpman (2000) have developed a general equilibrium framework where both the
boundaries of the firm and the market structure in which they operate are endogenous. However,
location choices are ignored so that there is unique environment faced by all firms. Finally, in the
urban economics literature, Davis (2001) studies the location of production relative to distribution
facilities and natural resources. However, his focus is on the relative magnitude of transport costs
for final goods and for natural resources. More closely related to this paper is the work of Ota and
Fujita (1993), who propose a model where firms make decisions about the location of their facilities
and these decisions in turn affect the urban environment. However, their model deals only with
location within a city, and is thus more useful to understand differences between a city’s centre
and its suburbs than differences across cities in an urban system.
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2. The model
Preferences
There are m sectors producing goods for final consumption. Consumers have Cobb-Douglas
preferences with equal shares of expenditure allocated to each of these sectors. We use superscripts
to index sectors as well as worker occupations (described below) and subscripts to index cities.
Thus, the indirect utility of a consumer working in occupation h in city i is
Vi =
ehi
P
, (1)
where ehi denotes individual consumption expenditure,
P =
m
∏
h=1
(
Ph
)1/m
(2)
is the global consumer price index, and Ph denotes the price of final goods in sector h. The latter
are freely tradeable across cities, hence their prices are common to all cities. All workers in the
economy are fully mobile across cities and occupations.
Technology
The input-output structure of each final sector is represented schematically in Figure 1. Final-
goods firms have two facilities: a headquarter and a production plant. Each firm can adopt one
of two organisational forms: integrated or multi-location. Integrated firms have their headquarter
and their production plant in the same city, while multi-location firms have their headquarter
and their production plant in different cities. In either case, headquarters use labour (managers)
and business services as inputs to produce headquarter services. Production plants then combine
these headquarter services with sector-specific intermediate inputs to produce final goods. Both
business services and sector-specific intermediate inputs are produced by outside suppliers with
labour, and are non-tradeable across cities.4 However, while the same business services are used
by headquarters in all sectors, the intermediates used by production plants differ across sectors.
It follows from this input-output structure that there are 2m + 1 occupations for workers. We
assign index 0 to workers employed in business services, and by extension to firms in the business
service sector; index h to workers directly employed by headquarters in sector h for h = 1,...,m
and to variables related to final production in that sector; and index m + h to workers employed
in the production of intermediate inputs specific to final sector h for h = 1,...,m, as well as to firms
producing those intermediates.
4Business services and sector-specific intermediate inputs are assumed non-tradeable for analytical tractability, but
the qualitative conclusions of the model would be unaffected if they were instead tradeable subject to iceberg costs
(this issue is further discussed in Section 4). Empirically, the proximity between business service suppliers and the
headquarters of their customers appears to be very important. Kolko (1999) documents the increasing concentration of
business services in the largest cities, which also attract a disproportionate share of headquarters (Shilton and Stanley,
1999). Furthermore Dekle and Eaton (1999) and Adserà (2000) provide evidence of localisation economies for business
services in Japan and the US respectively.
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Figure 1. Input-output structure of each sector
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Using this notation, we can now specify the details of firms’ technology. Final-goods firms are
perfectly competitive and have Cobb-Douglas technology, with cost shares η for the headquarter
and 1 − η for the production plant. Thus, a sector h firm with its headquarter in city i and its
production plant in city j (where j might be equal to or different from i) has a cost function given
by
Chi,j = c
h
i,j x
h
i,j , (3)
where xhi,j denotes output,
chi,j =
(
Hhi,j
)η(
Qm+hj
)1−η
, (4)
is the unit production cost, Hhi,j is the headquarter sub-cost, and Q
m+h
j is the production plant
sub-cost.
Headquarter sub-costs are in turn split in a Cobb-Douglas fashion between labour directly
employed by the headquarter and business services purchased from external suppliers, with
sub-shares µ and 1 − µ respectively. There is an endogenously determined mass s0i of business
service varieties produced in city i. All varieties enter into headquarters’ technology with constant
elasticity of substitution θ+1θ , where θ > 0. Thus, for an integrated firm with its headquarter and
its production plant in the same city i the headquarter sub-cost is
Hhi,i = H
h
i =
(
whi
)µ(
Q0i
)1−µ
, (5)
where whi denotes the wage per unit of labour for a worker employed in occupation h in city i,
Q0i =
{∫ [
q0i (k)
]−1/θ
dk
}−θ
(6)
is the relevant price index of business services in city i, q0i (k) is the price of variety k of business
services produced in city i.
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Each firm needs to transmit headquarter services (such as organisational decisions, marketing,
or finance) to its production plant. The transmission of a firm’s headquarter services to a produc-
tion plant located in a different city involves iceberg costs (for instance, a fraction of managers’ time
is lost in travelling to visit the plant). Consequently, for a multi-location firm with its headquarter
in city i and its production plant in another city j the headquarter input requirements are higher
by a factor ρ > 1 than if it was an integrated firm with both facilities in city i :
Hhi,j = ρH
h
i . (7)
This is meant to capture that, as Kim (1999) shows using US Census data, headquarter costs
are significantly higher for a multi-location firm than for a similarly-sized firm with integrated
headquarter and production.
Production plants for final goods use sector-specific intermediate inputs. There is an endogen-
ously determined mass sm+hi of intermediate inputs specific to sector h produced in city i. All
intermediate inputs specific to sector h enter into plants’ technology with constant elasticity of
substitution e+1e , where e > 0. Thus, the relevant price index of intermediate inputs specific to
sector h in city i is
Qm+hi =
{∫ [
qm+hi (k)
]−1/e
dk
}−e
, (8)
where qm+hi (k) is the price of intermediate input k specific to sector h in city i.
Both business services and sector-specific intermediate inputs are produced by monopolistically
competitive firms à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The cost function of a business service firm
producing variety k in city i is
C0i (k) =
[
α0 + β0y0i (k)
]
w0i , (9)
where y0i (k) denotes the firm’s output. The expression in brackets is the unit labour requirement,
which has both a fixed and a variable component. Thus, there are increasing returns to scale in the
production of each variety of business services. Similarly, the cost function of an intermediate firm
producing variety k specific to sector h in city i is
Cm+hi (k) =
[
α + βym+hi (k)
]
wm+hi . (10)
Internal urban structure
We model the internal spatial structure of cities in the simplest standard fashion. Production in
each city takes place at a central point, defined as the Central Business District (CBD). Surrounding
this, there is a line with residences of unit length. Residents commute from their residence to
the CBD and back, losing in the process a fraction of their unit labour supply equal to 2τ times
the distanced travelled. Each consumer chooses her place of residence so as to maximise utility,
given her occupation and income, and the bid-rent curve in the city. Because of fixed lot size, this
is equivalent to choosing residence so as to maximise net income. Thus, a consumer working in
occupation h in city i maximises whi (1− 2τz) − Ri(z) with respect to z, where z is the distance to
the CBD and Ri(z) is the differential land rent in city i for a residence located at distance z from the
CBD.
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The possibility of arbitrage across residential locations both within and across occupations
ensures that at the residential equilibrium the sum of commuting cost and land rent expenditures
is the same for all residents with the same wage; that workers sort themselves according to their
wage, with higher-paid workers (who have a higher opportunity cost of commuting time) living
closer to the CBD; that the city is symmetric and the city edges are at a distance Li/2 of the CBD
(where Li is total population in city i); and that the bid-rent curve is continuous, concave, and
piece-wise linear. Land rent at the city edges is normalised to zero. Integrating land rent over the
city yields total land rent:
Ri =
∫ Li/2
−Li/2
Ri(z)dz. (11)
Let us denote net labour available at the CBD of city i in occupation h by lhi . This is equal
to Lhi minus the total commuting time incurred by workers in this occupation. Summing across
occupations immediately implies:
2m
∑
h=0
lhi = Li(1− τLi). (12)
The cost of headquarters and production plants
Before we proceed to describe the mechanism for city creation, let us derive in two Lemmas
simplified expressions for the cost of production plants and headquarters in final-goods sectors.
Lemma 1 (The cost of production plants) In equilibrium the production plant sub-cost of a sector h
integrated firm in city i is
Qm+hi =
(
lm+hi
)−e
wm+hi .
Proof By Shephard’s Lemma, demand for each variety of intermediates is
ym+hi =
∫ ∂Chj,i
∂qm+hi
dj = (1− η)
(
Hhi
Qm+hi
)η(
qm+hi
Qm+hi
)−(e+1)/e∫
xj,i dj , (13)
where we have dropped index k since all variables take identical values for all intermediate
suppliers in the same sector and city. It follows from (13) that the elasticity of demand for each
intermediate with respect to a firm’s own price is − e+1e , so that the profit-maximising price for
each intermediate is a fixed relative markup over marginal cost:
qm+hi = (e + 1) β w
m+h
i . (14)
Free entry and exit in intermediates drives maximised profits to zero. From the zero profit condi-
tion, the only level of output in intermediate production consistent with zero profits is
ym+hi =
α
β e
. (15)
Demand for labour by intermediate producers can be obtained by application of Shephard’s
Lemma to (10) and integration over varieties as
lm+hi = s
m+h
i
∂ Chi
∂wm+hi
= sm+hi
[
α + βym+hi
]
= sm+hi α
e + 1
e
, (16)
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where (15) has been substituted in to yield the final expression. By choice of units of intermediate
output, we can set β = ( eα )
e(e + 1)−(e+1). Using (16) and (14), the price indices of (8) simplify into
Qm+hi =
[
sm+hi
(
qm+hi
)−1/e]−e
=
(
lm+hi
)−e
wm+hi . (17)
As in Fujita (1988) and Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990), in our model there is a monopolistically
competitive intermediate sector that hires workers and sells non-tradeable intermediates to final-
goods producers. A larger workforce employed in any given intermediate sector m + h of a city
leads to a wider range of intermediates being produced for use in final-good sector h. Since these
intermediates enter the production function of final-good producers in sector h with the same
constant elasticity of substitution e+1e , a wider range of available intermediates results in lower
production costs in this final-good sector. Hence, despite constant returns to scale at the firm level
in final production, there are aggregate increasing returns at the sector-city level, also known as
localisation economies. The strength of these increases with e.
Lemma 2 (The cost of headquarters) In equilibrium the headquarter sub-cost of a sector h integrated
firm in city i is
Hhi =
(
whi
)µ(
Q0i
)1−µ
,
where
Q0i =
(
l0i
)−θ
w0i .
The proof of this Lemma mirrors closely that of Lemma 1 and is thus relegated to Appendix
A. The sharing of business services by headquarters, like the the sharing of intermediate suppliers
by plants, gives rise to localisation economies, whereby a larger workforce employed in a city’s
business service sector leads to a wider range of business services being produced, which in turn
results in lower costs of operating headquarters.5 Since business services account for a fraction
1− µ of headquarter costs, these localisation economies increase with θ(1− µ). Furthermore, since
by (7) multi-location firms face the same price index for business services as integrated firms, these
localisation economies apply under either organisational form.
City formation
To complete the model, we need to specify a mechanism for city formation. The simplest alternat-
ive is to consider perfectly competitive land development companies or land developers.6 At the
5Headquarters and business service producers may face lower costs in environments where there is a large presence
of both activities for a variety of other reasons, such as drawing in part from a common pool of workers (Helsley and
Strange, 1990) or human capital interactions (Jovanovic and Rob, 1989, Glaeser, 1999). Nevertheless, we specify the
same micro-foundations for localisation economies in business services/headquarters as in intermediates/production
plants to keep the model as simple as possible.
6There is ample evidence regarding the pervasive role played by ‘large’ private agents in the United States land
market. Most of Garreau’s (1991) examples of edge-cities were originally the product of decisions by a single large
agent (see Henderson and Mitra, 1996, for complementary evidence on this).
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same time, active municipal governments with tax raising powers can play an equivalent role that
would lead to identical results.7 In fact, all we require to obtain our results is some mechanism that
prevents urban configurations that are sustainable only under a coordination failure from arising
in equilibrium — for instance, situations in which no-one moves away from inefficiently large
cities for fear of no-one else following. For simplicity, we also want to avoid lumpiness problems
(such as sectors being smaller than the smallest city).
We thus assume a large economy in which there is a continuum of land developers, not all of
which will be active in equilibrium. Each developer controls all land in several potential sites for
a city. Land developers can give occupation-specific subsidies to workers.8 Let us denote by Thi
the subsidy given by the developer in city i to workers with occupation h. There is free entry and
perfect competition amongst land developers. When active, each land developer seeks to maximise
total land rent in its city, as given by (11), net of any transfers paid to workers in each occupation:
max
{Thi }
Πi , Πi = Ri −
2m
∑
h=0
Thi L
h
i , (18)
subject to workers in each active occupation in the city obtaining the highest consumption income
available elsewhere, e¯:
Lhi e
h
i = L
h
i e¯ , L
h
i > 0 , (19)
and subject also to firms with only their headquarter, only their production plant, or both facilities,
in the city breaking even:(∫
i 6=j
xhi,j dj
)(
Ph −
(
ρHhi
)η (
Qm+h
)1−η)
= 0 , Ph −
(
ρHhi
)η (
Qm+h
)1−η
6 0 ,
∫
i 6=j
xhi,j dj > 0 ,
(20)(∫
i 6=j
xhj,i dj
)(
Ph −
(
ρHh
)η (
Qm+hi
)1−η)
= 0 , Ph −
(
ρHh
)η (
Qm+hi
)1−η
6 0 ,
∫
i 6=j
xhj,i dj > 0 ,
(21)
xhi,i
(
Ph −
(
Hhi
)η (
Qm+hi
)1−η)
= 0 , Ph −
(
Hhi
)η (
Qm+hi
)1−η
6 0 , xhi,i > 0 ,
(22)
where the integral
∫
i 6=j x
h
i,j dj aggregates the output of multi-location firms across all cities, and
Qm+h denotes the lowest sub-cost for a final-sector stand-alone plant elsewhere and ρHh denotes
the lowest sub-cost for a final-sector stand-alone headquarter elsewhere. Note that the worker
participation constraint of (19) is binding because of free worker mobility, which ensures that in
equilibrium workers collect the same net returns everywhere. Similarly, the firm participation
constraints of (20)–(22) are also binding.
Consumers are Arrow-Debreu shareholders in all firms and in all land development companies.
However, free entry by firms and land developers drives their profits to zero in equilibrium. Thus,
7See Fujita (1989) and Henderson and Becker (2000) for discussions of this issue and for an equivalence result between
these two types of institutions.
8See Helsley and Strange (1997) and Henderson and Becker (2000) for discussions of the instruments of control and
the extent of ownership of land developers.
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the equilibrium consumption expenditure of a worker with occupation h in city i living at a dis-
tance z from the CBD is the sum of wage income and any transfers, minus land rent expenditures:
ehi (z) = w
h
i (1− 2τz) + Thi − Ri(z) . (23)
To solve the model, it is useful to note that the developer’s programme is equivalent to a
situation in which the developer maximises the gap between the pre-transfer consumption ex-
penditure of workers in the city and the post-transfer income which they could obtain elsewhere,
subject to zero profit by firms and a feasibility constraint.
Lemma 3 (Equivalent developer’s programme) The developer’s programme is equivalent to
max
{lhi }
Πi , Πi =
2m
∑
h=0
whi l
h
i − Li e¯ ,
subject to (20)–(22), lhi > 0 and (12).
Proof Integrating (23) over population in the city and using (11) and (12) yields Lhi ehi = ∑2mh=0 whi lhi +
∑2mh=0 T
h
i L
h
i − Ri. Substituting the worker participation constraint of the original programme ,
Lhi e
h
i = L
h
i e¯, into this expression implies transfers such that ∑
2m
h=0 T
h
i L
h
i = Ri − ∑2mh=0 whi lhi + Lhi e¯.
Inserting this into the original programme (18) yields the result.
By lowering transfers down to the point where every worker gets e¯, a developer can extract any
surplus consumption income of workers in its city over that available elsewhere. Hence it is in the
developer’s interest to design the transfer structure so as to achieve an urban configuration such
that workers obtain the highest possible pre-transfer consumption income, thus maximising the
total wage bill in the city.
3. Equilibrium types and sizes of cities
In this section we show that in equilibrium there can be at most three types of cities: cities with
only headquarters and their business service suppliers, cities with only production plants in one
sector and their intermediate suppliers, and cities with only integrated firms in one sector and
their business service and intermediate suppliers. This is done in three steps. First, we show that
in equilibrium no city has both headquarters and plants belonging to multi-location firms (Lemma
4). Second, no city hosts production plants in more than one sector (Lemma 5). And third, a city
with integrated firms has neither headquarters nor production plants belonging to multi-location
firms (Lemma 6). We then proceed in the following section to study which of these three possible
types of cities exist in equilibrium depending on parameters.
Lemma 4 (Multi-location headquarter and plant separation) In equilibrium, headquarters and plants
belonging to multi-location firms do not coexist in the same city.
Proof Consider a city with stand-alone headquarters and production plants in the same sec-
tor. Then, from (20) and (21), Hhi = Hh and Qm+hi = Q
m+h =
(
Ph
) 1
1−η
(
ρHh
)− η1−η . But
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then an integrated firm operating in the same city and sector would make profits equal to
Ph − (Hhi )η(Qm+hi )1−η = (1− 1ρη )Ph > 0, which contradicts (22). Consider now a city with stand-
alone production plants in sector h and stand-alone headquarters in a different sector h′. By
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, a developer can transfer headquarter resources from sector h′ to sector h
without affecting localisation economies in the production of either business services or sector-
specific intermediates, nor its own profits. This will create the same profit opportunity from firm
integration, which the developer can appropriate by lowering transfers.
The headquarters of multi-location firms only locate in a city if it provides the lowest
headquarter cost available anywhere. Similarly, the production plants of multi-location firms
only locate in a city if it provides the corresponding intermediates at the lowest cost. If a city
were to provide both the lowest headquarter cost and the lowest costs for production plants for
multi-location firms in the same sector and they broke even, then multi-location firms with either a
headquarter or a production plant in the city would make positive profits by becoming integrated
firms — thus saving on the transmission cost for headquarter services. The local developer could
then capture the rents from this unexploited profit opportunity by lowering transfers, thus forcing
firms to pay higher wages so that worker income stays at e¯. Therefore, in equilibrium, headquarters
and plants belonging to multi-location firms in the same sector do not coexist in the same city.
Since resources used by headquarters, either directly or indirectly, can be shifted across sectors
without changing any wages, headquarters and plants belonging to multi-location firms do not
coexist in the same city even for different sectors. In effect, multi-location firms exist to exploit the
advantages of different types of cities for headquarters and production plants, so the headquarters
and production plants of multi-location firms are always located in different cities.
Lemma 5 (Production specialisation) In equilibrium, each city hosts production plants in at most one
sector.
Proof Consider a developer choosing how to allocate across sectors the local amount of labour en-
gaged in intermediate production. By Lemma 3, this involves maximising ∑mh=1 w
m+h
i l
m+h
i subject
to (20)–(22) and keeping ∑mh=1 lm+hi constant. By Lemma 1, wm+hi = Qm+hi
(
lm+hi
)e
. Changing the
allocation of labour across occupations m to 2m in any city does not change any price, Ph, nor any
headquarter cost, Hhi . Consequently, by (20)–(22), it does not affect the Qm+hi consistent with zero
profits. Hence, in choosing how to allocate across sectors the local amount of labour engaged in
intermediate production, the developer maximises
m
∑
h=1
wm+hi l
m+h
i =
m
∑
h=1
Qm+hi
(
lm+hi
)1+e
(24)
for given Qm+hi and ∑
m
h=1 l
m+h
i . The convexity of this expression implies that all labour producing
intermediates in any given city is allocated to a single sector.
This result is reminiscent of Henderson (1974). Recall that, because of its ability to extract any
surplus consumption income of workers in its city, each developer behaves as if maximising the
total wage bill in the city. With no equilibrium firm profits this implies maximising the value of
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production in the city. In the presence of localisation economies, final output in any given city and
sector rises more than proportionately with employment in that city and sector. Maximisation of
the value of production thus implies a corner solution for the allocation across sectors of labour
employed in intermediate production. Consequently, any city that hosts plants hosts them in only
one sector.
Lemma 6 (Specialisation by type of firms) In equilibrium, each city hosts either only final-sector
headquarters and business service suppliers, only final-sector manufacturing plants and intermediate sup-
pliers, or only integrated firms plus business services and intermediate suppliers.
Proof By Lemma 2,
(
whi
)µ(w0i )1−µ = Hhi (l0i )θ(1−µ). By Shephards’s Lemma, ∑mh=1 whi lhi = µ1−µ w0i l0i .
Combining these two equations yields w0i l
0
i =
( µ
1−µ
)−µ(l0i )(1+θ)(1−µ)[∑mh=1 (Hhi )1/µlhi ]µ. By inspec-
tion of this expression we can see that profit maximisation by land developers requires Hhi = Hi
for all h such that lhi > 0. Hence
m
∑
h=0
whi l
h
i = µ
−µ(1− µ)−(1−µ)Hi
(
l0i
)(1+θ)(1−µ)( m∑
h=1
lhi
)µ
. (25)
Maximisation of this component of the developer’s programme for given ∑mh=0 l
h
i shows that
m
∑
h=1
lhi =
µ
(1 + θ)(1− µ) l
0
i . (26)
Substituting (24)–(26) and Lemma 5 into the developer’s programme of Lemma 3, we can rewrite
this as
max
{l0i ,lhi ,lm+hi }
Πi , Πi =
(1 + θ)−µ
1− µ Hi
(
l0i
)1+θ(1−µ)
+ Qm+hi
(
lm+hi
)1+e − Li e¯ , (27)
subject to (20)–(22), lhi > 0 and (12).
From Lemmas 4 and 5, only five types of cities are possible: the three mentioned in the
Lemma, plus cities with both production plants of multi-location firms and integrated firms,
and cities with both headquarters of multi-location firms and integrated firms. To prove the
Lemma, it is sufficient to show that the last two types of cities are incompatible with profit
maximisation by the developers. By (20)–(22), in a city with both integrated firms and pro-
duction plants of multi-location firms,
(
ρHh
)η(Qm+hi )1−η = (Hi)η(Qm+hi )1−η = Ph, and hence
Hi = ρHh and Qm+hi =
(
Ph
) 1
1−η
(
ρHh
)− η1−η = Qm+h. Similarly, in a city with both integrated firms
and headquarters of multi-location firms,
(
ρHi
)η(Qm+h)1−η = (Hi)η(Qm+hi )1−η = Ph, and hence
Hi = 1ρ
(
Ph
) 1
η
(
Qm+h
)− 1−ηη = Hh and Qm+hi = ρ η1−η Qm+h. In either case, Hi and Qm+hi are pinned
down by the firm participation constraints, and hence they are taken as given by the developer
when implementing the programme of (27). By inspection of (27), given that θ > 0 and e > 0,
a configuration with both integrated firms and production plants of multi-location firms in the
same city cannot be an equilibrium, since the developer would do better either by having only
production plants or by having no production plants except those needed to have integrated firms.
Similarly, a configuration with both integrated firms and headquarters of multi-location firms in
the same city cannot be an equilibrium, since the developer would do better either by having only
headquarters or by having no headquarters except those needed to have integrated firms.
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Localisation economies in the production of both business services and sector-specific interme-
diates imply that a profit-maximising developer will avoid mixing headquarters and production
plants in a city, except possibly if these belong to integrated firms — due to the lower headquarter
requirements associated with integrated firms. Having reduced the possible city types to three, we
can now derive the equilibrium size of the different types of cities.
Lemma 7 (Equilibrium city sizes) In equilibrium, cities hosting only final-sector production plants and
intermediate suppliers (if any) have a population
LM =
e
τ(1 + 2e)
;
cities hosting only final-sector headquarters and business service suppliers (if any) have a population
LH =
σ
τ(1 + 2σ)
;
and cities hosting only integrated firms plus business services and intermediate suppliers (if any) have a
population
LI =
γ
τ(1 + 2γ)
;
where σ ≡ θ(1− µ), and γ ≡ ηθ(1− µ) + (1− η)e.
Proof Denote by subscript M variables corresponding to a city hosting only production plants for
multi-location firms. From (12),
lm+hM = L
m+h
M (1− τLm+hM ) . (28)
The developer’s programme of (27), for the case of a city hosting only production plants for multi-
location firms in sector h, can thus be expressed as
max
{Lm+hM }
Πm+hM , Π
m+h
M = Q
m+h
[
Lm+hM (1− τLm+hM )
]1+e
− Lm+hM e¯ . (29)
The first order condition for (29) implies that workers consumption expenditure equals the value
of their social marginal product
e¯ = (1 + e)Qm+h
[
Lm+hM (1− τLm+hM )
]e
(1− 2τLm+hM ) . (30)
Free entry of land developers exhausts their profits in equilibrium. Substituting (30) into (29) and
using Πm+hM = 0 yields equilibrium population for any city hosting only production plants as
LM = Lm+hM =
e
τ(1 + 2e)
. (31)
Similarly, denote by subscript H variables corresponding to a city hosting only headquarters for
multi-location firms. From (12) and (26),
l0H =
1 + σ− µ
1 + σ
LhH(1− τLhH) , (32)
lhH =
µ
1 + σ
LhH(1− τLhH) . (33)
13
By symmetry, Hh = H for all sectors. Substituting (32) into (27), the programme for the developer
of a city hosting only headquarters for multi-location firms is
max
{LH}
ΠH , ΠH =
(1 + θ)1+σ−µ(1− µ)σ
(1 + σ)1+σ
H[LH(1− τLH)]1+σ − LH e¯ . (34)
The first order condition for (34) together with ΠH = 0 yields equilibrium population for any city
hosting only headquarters as
LH =
σ
τ(1 + 2σ)
. (35)
Finally, denote by subscript I variables corresponding to a city hosting only integrated firms. From
(4), and Lemmas 2 and 1, the equilibrium unit production cost for integrated firms in sector h is
chI = (w
h
I )
ηµ(w0I )
η(1−µ)(wm+hI )
1−η(l0I )−ησ(lm+hI )−(1−η)e . (36)
By Shephard’s Lemma,
w0I l
0
I =
1− µ
µ
whI l
h
I =
η(1− µ)
1− η w
m+h
I l
m+h
I . (37)
From (26), Lemma 5, and (37),
whI
w0I
= 1 + θ ,
wm+hI
w0I
=
(1− η)l0I
η(1− µ)lm+hI
. (38)
Substituting (38) into (36) yields
chI = w
0
I l
0
I (1 + θ)
ηµ
(
1− η
η(1− µ)
)1−η (
l0I
)−η(1+σ)(
lm+hI
)−(1−η)(1+e)
. (39)
Zero profits for final firms imply that, if in equilibrium any city has only integrated firms in sector
h, chI = P
h. We can thus use this and (39) to solve for w0I l0I as a function of l0I , lm+hI , Ph, and
parameters. From (37), we obtain
w0I l
0
I + w
h
I l
h
I + w
m+h
I l
m+h
I =
1
η(1− µ)w
0
I l
0
I =
Ph
(
l0I
)η(1+σ) (lm+hI )(1−η)(1+e)
ηη(1− η)1−η(1 + θ)ηµ(1− µ)η . (40)
And by (12) and (26), l0I + lhI + lm+hI = 1+σ1+σ−µ l0I + lm+hI = LhI (1 − τLhI ), where LhI denotes total
population in this city. Hence, the developer’s programme of (27) for the case of a city hosting
only integrated firms can be expressed as
max
{l0I ,lm+hI }
ΠhI , Π
h
I =
Ph
(
l0I
)η(1+σ)(lm+hI )(1−η)(1+e)
ηη(1− η)1−η(1 + θ)ηµ(1− µ)η − L
h
I e¯ , (41)
subject to
1 + σ
1 + σ− µ l
0
I + l
m+h
I = L
h
I (1− τLhI ) . (42)
The first order conditions for (41) together with (41), (42), and ΠhI = 0 yield equilibrium population
for any city hosting only headquarters as
LI = LhI =
γ
τ(1 + 2γ)
, (43)
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and its split between occupations as
l0I =
η(1 + σ− µ)
1 + γ
LI(1− τLI) , (44)
lhI =
ηµ
1 + γ
LI(1− τLI) , (45)
lm+hI =
(1− η)(1 + e)
1 + γ
LI(1− τLI) . (46)
As is standard in the literature, there is a tradeoff between commuting costs (τ) and the extent of
aggregate increasing returns in the city (e, σ, or γ). Here aggregate increasing returns arise despite
constant-returns technology in final production due to the sharing of intermediate suppliers in cit-
ies with production plants of multi-location firms, due to the sharing of business service suppliers
in cities with headquarters of multi-location firms, and due to the sharing of both types of suppliers
in cities with integrated firms. The ability of competitive developers to control the composition of
the workforce in their city and to extract any surplus makes them efficient. At the competitive
equilibrium, cities will thus be of optimal size conditional on their type.9 This size increases with
the intensity of increasing returns and decreases with the cost of commuting. To achieve optimal
city size, developers must make transfers to local workers so as to cover the gap between the
value of their private and social marginal products — as can be seen from (30). With zero profits
for developers, total land rents equal total transfers, and thus are just enough to cover that gap.
This is known as the Henry George Theorem and is a standard result in urban economics, both
in the context of production subject to local aggregate increasing returns (Serck-Hanssen, 1969,
Starrett, 1974, Vickrey, 1977) and in the context of local public goods (Flatters, Henderson, and
Mieszkowski, 1974, Stiglitz, 1977, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979).
Lemma 8 (The Henry George Theorem) In equilibrium, all cities achieve optimal size, and developers
transfer all land rents in their city to local workers, filling the gap between the private and the public marginal
product of labour.
4. From sectoral to functional urban specialisation
It is now possible to derive our main result. The choice of organisational form by firms as well as
the urban structure depend on how much higher is the cost of providing headquarter services to a
plant in a different city as compared to a plant in the same city (ρ).
9It is only because the economy is large that cities can reach their optimal size regardless of the urban configuration
(i.e., the number of cities of each type) . Having instead a small economy creates a lumpiness problem whereby cities
in equilibrium are typically larger than their optimal size (since any size below optimum city size is unstable) and the
relative inefficiency of equilibrium city sizes depends on the configuration. Thus, in a small economy the main result
derived in Section 4 below would not depend on the comparison of the optimal city sizes but on the comparison of
the optimal sizes subject to the lumpiness constraint (which converge to the the optimal sizes as the economy grows
arbitrarily large). In the more pathological case of very small sectors consuming a large share of business services,
Lemma 5 may not even hold as some cities may find it worthwhile to host production plants of integrated firms in
two or more sectors so that they can share the costs of business services. For further discussion of these issues, see
Papageorgiou and Pines (2000).
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium firm organisation and urban structure) If ρ > ρˆ, where
ρˆ ≡
(
(1 + 2γ)1+2γσησe(1−η)e
γγ[ησ(1 + 2σ)1+2σ]η [(1− η)e(1 + 2e)1+2e]1−η
) 1
η
,
then all firms adopt an integrated organisational form, and all cities specialise by sector, hosting headquarters
and production plants plus business service and intermediate suppliers. If instead ρ < ρˆ then all firms adopt
a multi-location organisational form, and all cities specialise by function, with a share η(1+2σ)eη(1+2σ)e+(1−η)(1+2e)σ
of cities hosting headquarters from any sector plus business service suppliers, and the remaining cities
hosting production plants plus intermediate suppliers from the same sector, with equal proportions of cities
specialised in production in each of the m sectors.
Proof From (4), (7), and Lemmas 2 and 1, the equilibrium unit production cost for multi-location
firms is
chM = ρ
η(whH)
ηµ(w0H)
η(1−µ)(wm+hM )
1−η(l0H)−ησ(lm+hM )−(1−η)e . (47)
Dividing this by the unit production cost for integrated firms of (36) yields
chM
chI
=
(
ρ
ρˆ
)η
, (48)
where
ρˆ ≡
( whI
whH
)ηµ(
w0I
w0H
)η(1−µ)(wm+hI
wm+hM
)1−η(
l0I
l0H
)−ησ( lm+hI
lm+hM
)−(1−η)e 1η . (49)
The firm participation constraints of (20)–(22) imply that to be sustainable cities must offer firms
the possibility of producing at the lowest available unit cost. If ρ > ρˆ then chM > c
h
I , all firms adopt
an integrated organisational form, and every city hosts headquarters and production plants, which
by Lemma 5 belong to the same sector, plus their business service and intermediate suppliers. If
instead ρ < ρˆ then chM < c
h
I , all firms adopt a multi-location organisational form, and every city
either hosts headquarters from any sector plus their business service suppliers or hosts produc-
tion plants, which by Lemma 5 belong to the same sector, plus their intermediate suppliers. By
Shephard’s Lemma, w0H l
0
H =
1−µ
µ w
h
H l
h
H. From this, (26), and Lemma 5,
whH
w0H
= 1 + θ . (50)
The developer’s programme of Lemma 3, together with the exhaustion of developers’ profits due
to free entry imply
1
η(1− µ)w
0
I l
0
I = LI e¯ ,
1
1− µ w
0
H l
0
H = LH e¯ , w
m+h
M l
m+h
M = LM e¯ . (51)
From (38), (50), and (51),
whI
whH
=
w0I
w0H
=
ηLI l0H
LH l0I
,
wm+hI
wm+hM
=
(1− η)LI lm+hM
LM lm+hI
. (52)
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Substituting (28), (32), (44), (46), (52), and Lemma 7, into (49), and simplifying yields the value of ρˆ
given in the Proposition. Denote by NH the mass of cities that host headquarters of multi-location
firms and by NM the mass of cities that host production plants of multi-location firms when ρ < ρˆ.
By Shephard’s Lemma, w
0
H l
0
H NH
wm+hM l
m+h
M NM
= η(1−µ)1−η . Combining this with (51) yields the share of cities
that host only headquarters when ρ < ρˆ as η(1+2σ)eη(1+2σ)e+(1−η)(1+2e)σ . The remaining cities specialise
in production and, by symmetry, there are equal proportions of cities specialised in each of the m
sectors.
Discussion
In our model, firms face a trade-off between the gains from integrating their headquarter and
production plant and the gains from separating them. The gains from integration stem from
lower headquarter requirements. The gains from separation arise from the lower costs of operating
headquarters in cities with a higher specialisation in business services, and the lower costs of op-
erating production plants in cities with a higher specialisation in the corresponding intermediates.
When the transmission cost for headquarter services is high, firms remain integrated. Because
of localisation economies in production and urban congestions costs increasing with size, this in
turn leads cities to specialise by sector. In contrast, when the transmission cost for headquarter
services is low, firms wish to locate their headquarter in cities where business service employment
is abundant and their production plant in cities with a greater same-sector specialisation in final
production. And it is in the interest of profit-maximising developers to make it feasible for firms
to implement this separation. Since the same organisational choice is made by a large number
of firms, it in turn affects the employment patterns of cities, which is itself what makes the
organisational choice worthwhile. As a result, some cities specialise in headquarters and business
services and others in final and intermediate production, the latter also being specialised by sector.
Many business and economic historians have argued that the extra costs of coordinating and
monitoring multi-location firms relative to integrated firms has decreased very significantly fol-
lowing key technological developments in transport and communication technologies, as well as
new management practices (Chandler, 1977, Kim, 1999). The cost of transporting goods, people,
and ideas has declined dramatically over the last century. For instance, maritime freight in 1990
was only one third as costly as in 1920, while for air-travel the revenue per passenger-mile in 1990
was one sixth of what it was in 1930. Large as they may seem, these changes are dwarfed by the free
fall in telecommunication costs: the cost of a three-minute telephone conversation between New
York and London fell by 98.7% between 1930 and 1990 (Jones, 1997). According to Yates (1989,
1991), managerial and accounting innovations have played an even greater role than the sheer
reduction in the cost of physical distance. Of particular importance has been the development of
duplicators of various types, such as the typewriter together with the use of carbon copies, and
later the photocopying and fax machines. Such duplicators made the transmission of information
along a managerial hierarchy and across space much faster and much cheaper. On the whole, it
seems that this reduction in the cost of coordination and monitoring across distant locations can to
a very large extent be taken as exogenous to the rise of multi-location firms.
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Figure 2. Unit costs of multi-location relative to integrated firms
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This reduction in the additional costs related to remote management can be simply represented
in the model as a reduction in ρ. Figure 2 plots the unit production cost of multi-location firms (cM)
relative to the unit production cost of integrated firms (cI) as a function of ρ.10 When ρ is above
ρˆ any developers attempting to set up cities with either only headquarters or only production
plants cannot attract firms in the face of the competition from developers in cities hosting only
integrated firms, which offer lower unit production costs. Thus every firm adopts an integrated
organisational structure and every city hosts headquarters and production plants from one sector.
By Proposition 1, when ρ falls below ρˆ cities with either only headquarters or only production
plants of multi-location firms offer a combined unit cost below that available in integrated cities.
Firms previously organised as a single unit become multi-unit organisations. Multi-unit firms loc-
ate their headquarters separately from their own production plants, but close to other headquarters
and business service firms. They also locate their plants close to other manufacturing facilities
with which they can share intermediate suppliers. This leads to a change in urban structure, with
a shift in the main dimension along which cities specialise, from a specialisation by sector to a
specialisation by function.
In practice, localisation economies are likely to be stronger for business services than for man-
ufacturing intermediates (see Markusen, 1989, for a conceptual discussion of this issue and Dekle
and Eaton, 1999, for empirical evidence). In terms of the model, this simply requires that σ > e.
In this case, it follows from Lemma 7 and Proposition 1 that when cities specialise by function,
headquarters and business services becomes concentrated in larger cities and manufacturing pro-
10The figure plots (48) for ρˆ given by Proposition 1 with parameters σ = 0.07 (a 1% increase in employment in
a city hosting headquarters and business services increases local productivity by 1.07%), e = 0.05 (a 1% increase in
employment in a city hosting only production plants and intermediate suppliers increases local productivity by 1.05%),
and η = 0.2 (headquarters account for 20% of total costs). By symmetry, superscript h has been dropped from chM and
chI . Note that, by (36) and (47), cM varies with ρ but cI does not. With these parameter values, the change in firms’
organisation and in urban structure takes place when the additional costs of remote management fall below 17.3% of
the management costs for an integrated firm.
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duction gets located in smaller cities (with σ > e, LH > LI > LM).11 All of this provides a consistent
explanation for the stylised facts documented in the introduction.
While the model predicts well recent changes in firms’ organisation and in the urban structure,
it presents these as happening suddenly as ρ falls below a certain threshold. The catastrophic
aspect of these changes is due to the stylised nature of the model. A smoother transition could be
obtained with a sector-specific cost of separating headquarters and production plant, ρh. Assume
a gradual decline in this cost across all sectors with ρ1 < ρ2 < ... < ρm at all times. Then as ρ1 falls
below ρˆ, cities previously specialised in sector 1 undergo a shift from sectoral to functional special-
isation. Some cities are left with only production plants in this sector, whereas their headquarters
concentrate in business centres. The same happens again in sector 2,...,m as ρ2,...,ρm fall below ρˆ.
While improvements in physical transportation technologies have facilitated the dispersion
of manufacturing activities, improvements in telecommunication technologies may have the op-
posite effect on business services and other knowledge-intensive activities (Leamer and Storper,
2000). Because of the complementarity between telecommunication and face-to-face contact (as
evidenced for instance by Gaspar and Glaeser, 1998), cheaper and more sophisticated telecom-
munications increase the benefits of clustering in activities characterised by complex and timely
interactions such as business services. In our framework, this implies a growing difference in the
strength of localisation economies between business services and manufacturing intermediates.12
To isolate the effects of such a change formally, consider an increase in localisation economies in
business services, σ, and a corresponding reduction in localisation economies in manufacturing, e,
so as to keep average localisation economies, γ ≡ ησ+(1− η)e, constant. In the absence of changes
in the urban structure, such changes in localisation economies imply smaller manufacturing cities
and a growth in the size of cities hosting headquarters and business services. However, theses
changes in localisation economies may also trigger further changes in the organisation of produc-
tion within firms and across cities. Regarding the threshold for the separation of headquarters and
production (ρˆ), there are two effects of opposite sign:
dρˆ
dσ
∣∣∣∣
de=− η1−η dσ
= log
[
(1− η)σ(1 + 2e)2
ηe(1 + 2σ)2
]
ρˆ ≷ 0 . (53)
There is a negative effect on ρˆ working through relative city sizes: if σ À e, LH À LM, so lumping
production with headquarters and business services saves headquarter resources without much
added congestion. On the other hands, there is a positive effect on ρˆ working through relative
wages: if σ À e, wH À wM, so lumping production with headquarters and business services
involves paying production workers much more than they would earn in separate cities. If busi-
ness services generate much stronger localisation economies than manufacturing intermediates
this second effect tends to dominate: urban concentrations of headquarters and business services
11If we were to introduce the possibility of supplying business services and manufacturing intermediates to firms in a
different city subject to some trade cost, then a greater difficulty in supplying business services at a distance would also
result in higher localisation economies for business services than for manufacturing intermediates. Similarly, a greater
impact of the congestion costs associated with larger cities on manufacturing than on business services, say because of
their different land intensity, would have analogous implications for the relative magnitude of localisation economies.
12An increase in the share of headquarter costs accounted for by business services purchased from external suppliers,
1− µ, as compared to directly employed labour would have the same effect (recall that σ ≡ (1− µ)θ).
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tend to be very large; as a consequence of the high wages that workers must be paid to compensate
for high congestion costs, production plants and their intermediate suppliers, in which localisation
economies are weaker, are located elsewhere for a wider range of values of ρ.13
5. Concluding comments
Our model relates stylised facts regarding changes in the organisation of firms and changes in
the urban structure. Technological progress in transport and telecommunication technologies
have made it less costly for firms to separate their production facilities from their headquarter
and management facilities. Such a separation is worthwhile only if the firms can locate their
production facilities in environments with greater same sector specialisation and their headquar-
ters in business centres where business service employment is abundant. This in turn gives a
strong incentive for cities to shift from a main specialisation along a sectoral dimension to a main
specialisation along a functional dimension, leading to the emergence of separate business centres
and manufacturing cities. With greater benefits from proximity for headquarters and business
services than for manufacturing, the shift from sectoral to functional specialisation also implies
that business centres are few and large whereas manufacturing centres are more numerous and
smaller in size.
Although outside the scope of this paper, two extensions of this model are worth considering.
First, one could enrich the model by assuming different types of business services. Some business
services (e.g., standard business banking or equipment leasing services) need to be provided on
a frequent basis and benefit from a proximity between suppliers and customers. There are also
sophisticated business services (e.g., specialised financial advice for mergers-and-acquisitions)
that are not required as often and for which a proximity between similar business service firms
is more important. Finally, there are routinised business services (e.g., call centres) that can be
easily be provided from far-away. In this case, when business services and manufacturing become
separated, we would expect day-to-day services to locate in relatively large cities close to the
headquarters of their customers, more sophisticated services might cluster in a handful of ’world
cities’ (such as New York, London, and Tokyo) concentrating all the highest management functions
(Sassen, 1991), and the likes of call centres might be farmed-out to low-cost locations. Second, one
could incorporate a richer geography. For instance, the cost of managing production remotely
might increase in the distance from the headquarter. This could explain the existence of regional
business centres that host headquarters whose plants are predominantly in close-by cities.
13Dekle and Eaton (1999) and Adserà (2000) find evidence that this kind of process is taking place in Japan and the US
respectively.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2
By Shephard’s Lemma, demand for each variety of business services is
y0i =
∫ ∂Chi,j
∂q0i
dj = η(1− µ)
(
Qm+hi
Hhi
)1−η(
whi
Q0i
)µ(
q0i
Q0i
)−(θ+1)/θ(
xi,i + ρ
∫
j 6=i
xi,j dj
)
. (A1)
It follows from (A1) that the elasticity of demand for each business service with respect to a firm’s
own price is − θ+1θ , so that the profit-maximising price for each business service is a constant
relative markup over marginal cost:
q0i = (θ + 1) β
0 w0i . (A2)
Free entry and exit in business services drives maximised profits to zero. From the zero profit
condition, the only level of output in services consistent with zero profits is
y0i =
α0
β0 θ
. (A3)
Demand for labour by business service suppliers can be obtained by application of Shephard’s
Lemma to (9) and integration over varieties as
l0i = s
0
i
∂ C0i
∂w0i
= s0i
[
α0 + β0y0i
]
= s0i α
0 θ + 1
θ
, (A4)
where (A3) has been substituted in to yield the final expression. By choice of units of business
service output, we can set β0 = ( θ
α0
)
θ
(θ + 1)−(θ+1). Using (A4) and (A2), the price indices of (6)
simplify into
Q0i =
[
s0i
(
q0i
)−1/θ]−θ
=
(
l0i
)−θ
w0i . (A5)
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